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Abstract. Methods for source detection in high noise environments are crucial for
single-photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) medical imaging and especially for
homeland security applications, which is our main interest. In the latter case, one deals
with detecting the presence of low emission nuclear sources with significant background
noise (with Signal To Noise Ratio (SNR) 1% or less). In all passive emission problems,
direction sensitive detectors are needed, to match the dimensionalities of the image and
the data. Collimation, used for that purpose in standard γ-cameras, is not an option.
Instead, Compton γ-cameras (and their analogs for other types of radiation) can be utilized.
Backprojection methods suggested before by two of the authors and their collaborators
enable detection in the presence of a random uniform background. In most practical
applications, however, cargo packing in shipping containers and trucks creates regions of
strong absorption, while leaving streaming gaps open. In such cases backprojection methods
prove ineffective and lose their sensitivity. Nonetheless backprojection reconstructions
suggest that some indications of presence of a source might remain. To learn such features
(if they do exist), a deep neural network approach is implemented in 2D, which exhibits
higher sensitivity and specificity than the backprojection techniques in a low scattering case
and works well when presence of complex cargo makes backprojection fail.
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1. Introduction
Checking for presence of illicit nuclear materials (most probably in small quantities and
shielded) at border crossings and shipping cargo containers in harbors is an important
homeland security task. Ideally, one would try to reconstruct from the detected signals
the source distribution function inside the cargo. When the data is sufficiently well behaved
(e.g., in SPECT), analytic reconstruction is possible [26]. However, in a very low SNR
environment, as in the case of illicit nuclear source detection, this is impossible. The saving
grace is that in this case practitioners are more interested in getting reliable information
about the presence of a source, rather than its exact location.
As is well known in passive emission imaging, directional information obtained by
direction sensitive detectors is necessary for signal detection / reconstruction. Indeed,
otherwise the data measured has insufficient dimension for recovery of an image. Directional
information is especially critical when SNR is too low for the intensity fluctuations due to
the presence of a source to be statistically significant. The following options for obtaining
directional sensitivity are available:
• Mechanical collimation, when only rays incident along (or close to) a certain line are
allowed to reach the detector (see section
S:compton
2). This, while determining the incoming
photon’s direction, significantly reduces the signal strength and thus becomes unsuitable
for low SNR.
• Compton γ-cameras are a novel type of γ radiation detectors that determine a surface
cone of possible incident trajectories, rather than the exact directions.
• Neutron detectors are being developed that (albeit based on different physics principles)
produce similar cone information and lead to similar mathematical analysis.
The main goal is to detect the presence/absence of a source, not necessarily its location‡.
Nevertheless, the backprojection detection technique introduced in [5,29] relied upon finding
suspicious locations. It utilized the assumptions of geometric smallness of the source
and of existence of a sufficient number of particles from the source reaching the detector
being ballistic (non-scattered). This technique works reasonably well in the absence of
complex cargo, but starts failing if such cargo is present [6]. However, visual inspection
of the backprojected data (see [6]) seems to indicate that the data might still contain a
signature of the source presence. Indeed, when the method of [5] was applied to some cases
of complex cargo in [6], despite its failure to locate the source, such signatures (e.g., the
pathways between cargo boxes highlighted differently) seemed to appear only when a source
was present (See Fig.
fig:Cargo
1 below). No model to this effect has been developed, no telling
features have been learned, and thus no detection algorithm came out of such observations.
This has led the authors to attempt deep learning for the source inference in the hope that
a network could learn what we could not. The reader should notice that no processing
‡ If there is high probability of presence of the source, one can check the cargo with other (handheld) devices.
However, one also needs to achieve high specificity, to avoid large numbers of false positives.
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Figure 1. (Left): Example of complex cargo configuration for which backprojection
methods fail (i.e., no statistically suspicious locations are found). The red spot denotes the
source location, the grey area represents iron and the white area represents air. (Middle):
Backprojection results in absence of source. (Right): Backprojection results in presence of
source.fig:Cargo
(e.g., backprojecting) of the raw data was done before feeding it to the network. Since
the authors do not know what features would be of importance, we have decided to not
impose our math prejudice on the data (especially taking into account that backprojection
is a smoothing operator, and the relevant information is most probably contained in some
sharper features).
We describe now the structure of the article. Section
S:compton
2 contains a brief description
of the Compton type cameras and references to known analytic approaches. In Section
S:inversion
3
the backprojection technique used in [5, 29] is briefly described and difficulties of complex
cargo scenarios are indicated. Success of deploying neural networks is predicated upon our
access to sufficient data for neural network training. Thus, the first step - generating various
complex cargo scenarios is described in Section
S:cargo
4. To avoid the inverse crime (overfitting),
different processes of generating cargos are used for creating training and testing samples.
Then, in absence of real data (which would require having weapons grade nuclear materials
and physically creating thousands of different cargoes), we use (Section
S:forward
5) the technique of
forward radiation transport simulations customarily used in nuclear engineering. As it has
been mentioned, the actual type of radiation is mathematically irrelevant, but to be close
to real world scenarios and numerical parameter values, the case of γ-photons coming from
an U-238 source and real world material parameters for cargo are used. The design of the
network is described in section
S:CNN
6. The results are presented in Section
S:results
7. Additional remarks
can be found in section
S:remarks
8. Acknowledgements are provided in section
S:acknowledgements
9. Some auxiliary
tables are located in the Appendix.
2. Collimated and Compton γ-Cameras
S:compton
Mechanical collimators (see Fig.
fig:Collimator
2) can be installed in front of a direction insensitive
γ−camera to block all particles but those incident along (or close to) a desired trajectory.
Mechanical collimators are widely used in medical imaging. They, however, significantly
attenuate the signal and require rotating the detector (or the object). In the applications
with sufficiently high SNR, this additional data loss is not such a problem. In dealing with
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Figure 2. (Left): Collimator used in nuclear medicine (Source:
http://www.nuclearfields.com/collimators-nuclear-medicine.htm) (Right): Light colli-
mation diagram (Source: http://www.fiber-optical-networking.com/getting-know-fiber-
collimator.html)fig:Collimator
low SNR signals however, it renders recovery of weak signals impossible. For this reason
one can consider Compton type cameras instead.
The Compton camera is a type of γ-particle detector§ that does not attenuate the
incident particles, but also provides less detailed direction information than collimation
would give. Only a surface cone of possible incoming directions is measured rather than
a precise trajectory (see Fig
fig:Compton
3). In the absence of mechanical collimation, signal strength
Figure 3. Surface cone produced by Compton camera from particle detectionfig:Compton
is effectively maintained, although the directional information is less precise and thus data
analysis becomes more complex. On the other hand, the data provided is significantly over-
determined (five-dimensional space of cones versus the unknown distribution being three-
dimensional). This turns out not to be a bad thing at all, but rather a blessing for inversion
(see [26] for details and further references).
§ As we have mentioned before, novel neutron detectors (albeit based upon different physics rather than
Compton scattering) that provide mostly similar cone information are currently being developed.
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A variety of exact inversion formulas of filtered-backprojection and other types have
been developed and implemented (see [26] and references therein). The choices are much
more diverse than for the usual Radon transform inversions (see [21]). The reason is that
the Compton data is highly overdetermined. It was shown that this feature can be used to
get high quality reconstructions in SPECT in presence of 50% noise and higher. However,
this is a far cry from the low SNRs encountered in the homeland security problems described
above.
3. Backprojection Techniques and Cargo Issues
S:inversion
In [5, 6, 29], a backprojection technique was used, which employed the assumption that
the possible source would be geometrically small and a sufficient number of ballistic (i.e.,
unscattered) particles from the source to the detector are detected. The idea is that when
backprojected, the ballistic trajectories would pass through the same small geometric region,
where the source is located, and this accumulation might be statistically significant to detect
the source by finding its location.
The technique was provided with a (not totally rigorous, but supported by numerical
simulations) statistical analysis [5,6,29]. It also provided some predictions of sensitivity and
specificity of the detection results. This approach worked extremely well when a uniform
random background noise is assumed. However, in the presence of complex scattering and
absorbing cargo, one cannot rely upon ballistic particles, which might be none at all. Hence,
as is shown in [6], the technique (as well as its crude mathematical justification there) fails and
the backprojection cannot find statistically relevant indications of the source’s location, and
thus its presence. It was observed, however, that visually there have been some distinctions
between the backprojected data in presence and absence of a source. This indicated the
possibility that there still might be some features (which the authors could not spell out or
compute) that could possibly lead to detection. We therefore switch to the deep learning
approach, with the hope that a network could learn these unknown features.
4. Simulating Cargo Scenarios
S:cargo
One should naturally start with producing a large quantity of training and testing data.
In order to obtain rich training data for a neural network, at least thousands (better
hundreds of thousands or millions) of cargo configurations are needed. The more training
data can be obtained, the better. Due to the high computation costs, we were restricted to
several thousands of samples. However, our results (see section
S:results
7) already show a success in
detection.
To start, we randomly produce several thousand cargo configurations and compute
forward radiation data simulations for each one. In order to avoid overfitting (a.k.a, an
inverse crime), one needs to apply different cargo generation procedures for the training and
testing data.
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4.1. Procedural Generation of Training Cargo Configurations
A square cargo hold of size of 2.4m× 2.4m is assumed and partitioned into 2.4cm× 2.4cm
cells (the possible source would occupy one of them). Each cell can be indexed via a pair of
row and column indices, (i, j), with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 100 and is assigned a material identification
number IDi,j. These numbers correspond to a variety of materials according to the Table
tab:matid
1
below.
ID Material Molecular Composition
1 Air N (78.1%), O (20.9%), Ar (0.94%), H (0.06%)
2 Concrete H(0.5%), O (48.7%), Na (1.7%), Mg (2.5%), Al (4.5%),
Si (30.8%), K (1.9%), Ca (8.1%), Fe (1.2%), traces of
Th-232 and U-238 and their daughters
3 Highly Enriched Uranium Uranium (100%)
4 Iron Fe (100%)
5 Cotton O (25%), C (25%), H (50%)
6 Wood O (25%), C (25%), H (50%)
7 Plastic C (33.3%), H (66.7%)
8 Fertilizer K (13.9%), N (46.8%), O (30%), P (9.3%)
Table 1. Material Identificationstab:matid
Real cargo typically consists of several large distinct boxes with small spaces in
between. In order to emulate this, an algorithm is implemented to generate different cargo
configurations. It consists of three main steps:
• A network of several horizontal and vertical “corridors” between boxes with random
widths and locations is generated. The number of corridors c is selected randomly in a
desired range cmin ≤ c ≤ cmax.
• The resulting configurations are unlikely to be symmetric, while real cargo might happen
to be symmetric. To check whether symmetry plays any role in detectability‖, a portion
of the samples produced are “symmetrized” by enforcing various (rotation and mirror)
symmetry rules.
• Connected components of the rest of the space are identified as distinct “cargo boxes.”
Then material contents are assigned to all boxes. In a subset of (rather than all)
symmetric cargo configurations, material contents are also “symmetrized” according to
the corresponding rule.
Generating the corridors between pieces of cargo is performed using a modification of
the procedure outlined in [9] for generating road networks. Our modification is restricted to
networks consisting of horizontal and vertical segments.
‖ Disclosure: Our results show that symmetries do not influence detectability.
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Figure 4. A selection of cargo configurations procedurally generated via Algorithm 1fig: examples
Remark. Instead of selecting corridor locations uniformly randomly, road locations are
selected according to a probability distribution generated from a type of gradient noise
developed by Ken Perlin in 1983 [22] in order to automate the production of realistic
looking textures in computer graphics. Identification of connected components (“boxes”)
is performed using SciPy’s (Scientific Python, a popular Python package for scientific
computing [14]) implementation of the algorithms outlined in [28].
The entire generation procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1 in the Appendix (See
section
S:Appendix
10).
4.2. Procedural Generation of Testing Cargo Configurations
To avoid the inverse crime of overfitting, testing configurations are produced by a somewhat
similar, but independent algorithm. Namely, the middle points, the lengths and width of the
corridors are selected randomly and independently. Moreover, the corridors are not required
to be vertical or horizontal, or even orthogonal at their intersections anymore. Finding the
boxes (connected components of the complement) and filling them with materials is also
done randomly, similarly to the training case.
4.3. Source placement
A source of a (randomized) strength corresponding to approximately 1% SNR is placed
randomly into the cargo.
Multiple sources (0, 1, 2, 3, or 4) are also modeled to see the effect on detection. Two
scenarios are used:
(i) when all the sources have the same strength ≈ 1% SNR,
and
(ii) when the strength of the source is deluted between several locations.
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One naturally expects deterioration of the detection in the 2nd case, while it would not be
surprising if it happened in the 1st as well. Indeed, the backprojection detection, as well most
probably the one by deep networks, if successful, should use some geometric assumptions
(e.g., geometric smallness of the source), since the source’s strength alone would not be
statistically significant. Thus, multiplying the number of sources in principle might degrade
the geometric features of importance (albeit we do not know what these are).
5. Forward radiation simulations
S:forward
As previously mentioned, the nature of particles is irrelevant, but in order to be in realistic
situations, the γ particle detection is considered, where the material parameters and emission
and background rates assume realistic values.
After the cargo scenario has been created, one needs to simulate training and testing
data by solving a massive forward radiation transport computation. Luckily, this is what
nuclear engineering researchers are trained to do.
5.1. Physics Preliminary
S:physics
Uranium-238 (U-238) photons from the 1.001 MeV emission line have mean-free-path in
high-Z materials sufficiently high to be detected outside the container (13.3mm mean-free-
paths) [25]. In our application, sources of background radiation include a concrete base
located some distance below the container. (Cosmic rays and other natural sources can be
easily included and do not influence the results much.) These background sources radiate at
much higher energies than 1.001 MeV, including 1.461 MeV from Potassium-40, 1.12 MeV
and 1.76 MeV from Bismuth-214, and 2.61 MeV from Thallium-208 (Bismuth and Thallium
are products of the decay of Uranium-238 and Thorium 232 respectively, and are present in
trace amounts in concrete). Gamma photons which downscatter from these sources into the
energy group surrounding the 1.001 MeV line account for the noise in our signal. Gamma
photons from the source will also undergo scattering and absorption within the volume of the
container, which will reduce the number of ballistic source particles reaching the detectors
placed around the container, thus weakening the signal.
5.2. Mathematics of the forward radiation data simulation
The radiation transport within the cargo container is modeled by the linear Boltzmann
equation, given below using the multigroup approximation:
~Ω · ~∇+ Σgt (~r)Ψg(~r, ~Ω) =
G∑
g′=1
L∑
l=0
Σg
′→g
s,l (~r)
l∑
m=−l
Φg
′
l,m(~r) +Q
g(~r, ~Ω) (1) eq: Boltzmann
where ~r ∈ D is the position, ~Ω ∈ S2 the set of discrete directions and g ∈ [1, G] the energy
group. D is the volume of the cargo container, S2 is the unit sphere, G is the total number of
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energy groups, Ψg is the photon angular flux in the energy group g, Σgt is the total interaction
cross section in group g, Σg
′→g
s,l is the l
th−Legendre moment of the scattering cross section
from group g′ to group g, L is the maximum anisotropy expansion order, and Qg is the
volumetric source of photons in group g (stemming from the U-238 source). The moments
of the angular flux are given by
Φgl,m(~r) =
∫
4pi
Yl,m(~Ω)Ψ
g(~r, ~Ω)dΩ (2) eq: moments
where Yl,m is the spherical harmonic of order of l and degree m. Eq. (
eq: Boltzmann
1) is supplied with
boundary conditions:
Ψg(~r, ~Ω) = hg(~r, ~Ω) ∀~r ∈ ∂D− (3) eq: bd_cond
where ∂D− is the incoming boundary defined as ∂D− = {~r ∈ ∂D such that ~Ω · ~n(~r) < 0}
with ~n(~r) the outward unit normal vector at position ~r. The function hg describes the
background radiation due to a large concrete slab underneath the container, as previously
described. Cross sections for various materials were generated using NJOY-99 [20]. The
materials’ compositions are given in Table
tab:matid
1. The multigroup structure employed ranges
from 1.00099 MeV to 2.61449 MeV with narrow bands centered at the radiation lines of the
background and U-238. See Table
tab:egroups
5 in the Appendix for details (Section
S:Appendix
10).
For the purposes of this paper, calculations are carried out in two-dimensional space
and only the energy group corresponding to the 1.001 MeV line is considered after solving
Eq. (
eq: Boltzmann
1). The photon transport equation, Eq. (
eq: Boltzmann
1), is discretized using standard techniques:
(i) Sn product Gauss-Legendre-Chebychev angular quadrature [24] is employed (only a
small number of polar angles are needed, but a very high number of azimuthal angles
are needed to resolve properly the angular distribution in the 2D domain.)
(ii) Spatial discretization based on a standard bilinear discontinuous finite element technique
with upwinding at cell interfaces. [23,27]
(iii) Transport sweeps and Source Iteration are employed to solve the resulting system. [18]
Once the transport equation, Eq. (
eq: Boltzmann
1), has been solved, the outgoing angular photon flux
at any boundary edge in 2D is recorded, which serves as the input data for use in Deep
Learning and Backprojection.
Once configurations have been generated, a radiating source emitting an expected
8042.17 photons per second at 1.001 MeV is randomly placed, a forward radiative transfer
equation is solved, and from its solution the radiation angular flux distribution on the
boundary of the cargo is collected.
The situations of presence of zero to four randomly placed sources are modeled.
6. Convolutional Neural Network
S:CNN
Using a full network for the problem seems to be hardly feasible even in 2D, less in 3D, in
particular due to high dimensionality of the Compton camera data. The saving grace here is
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that, as in many imaging problems [19], one expects mostly correlations between close pixels,
and hence convolutional neural networks (CNN), which are much sparser, offer a hope. We
thus construct, train, and test a deep convolutional neural network (CNN).
The suggested CNN architecture is summarized in Fig.
fig:NNarch
5 below. The network is trained
on 4600 simulated cargo configurations with zero to four randomly placed sources. The Is 4600 the
correct num-
ber??
output is a probability measure P on {0, 1}. A source is determined to be present if
P(x = 1) > 0.5, and absent otherwise. The loss function used for training is the binary
cross-entropy loss:
L(y, yˆ) = −y log yˆ − (1− y) log(1− yˆ) (4)
Where y is that network prediction and yˆ is the target value (see [12]). The CNN was
trained on simulations of a localized source in the presence of high uniform background
noise (SNR = 0.01). In all cases, early stopping is used to halt training before over-fitting.
The various hyper-parameter values used in training are summarized in Table
tab:hyper-params
2 below. The
CNN is implemented using Keras with Tensorflow as its backend. Keras is a high level API¶
for interfacing with machine learning toolkits such as Tensorflow, Theano, and Microsoft
Cognitive Toolkit. It helps streamline the construction and training of neural networks [10].
Tensorflow is Google’s machine learning toolkit and was chosen due to its scalability, wide
range of features, and the wide range of documentation and tutorials available [1]. Any
parameters not explicitly mentioned here were set to default values.
Figure 5. CNN architecture used for source detection. The left-most cell shows an example
of the detector data input to the CNN. 2×2 Max pooling layers are placed after every second
convolutional layer.fig:NNarch
7. Results
S:results What was the
input data
size?
In 1738 randomly generated cargo configurations up to 4 sources are randomly placed and
So, is it 1738
or 4600?
particle detections are simulated for an exposure time measured by the expected background
detection levels ranging from 10000 particles to 100000 particles. The data were fed into
¶ Application Programming Interface
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Optimization Method Adam (See [15])
Activation RELU (Softmax at output)
Bias True
Convolution Window Size 3x3
Learning Rate 2.0× 10−5
Learning Rate Decay Rate 0
Batch Size 4
Early Stopping Patience 3 epochs
Loss Binary Cross-Entropy
Table 2. Hyper-parameters used during trainingtab:hyper-params
the trained CNN for source presence prediction. Two different scenarios are considered, the
case where each source has 1% SNR (Table
tab: perf_ms_1
3) and the case where the source strength of 1%
SNR is split evenly among each source (Table
tab:perf_ms_2
4). The results obtained clearly confirm our
expectations (see Section
S:inversion
3).
Sensitivity
one
source
Sensitivity
two
sources
Sensitivity
three
sources
Sensitivity
four
sources
Specificity
Expected Particle Count CNN BP CNN BP CNN BP CNN BP CNN BP
100000 0.9364 - 0.9901 - 0.9980 - 1.0000 - 0.9701 -
90000 0.9307 - 0.9884 - 0.9976 - 0.9977 - 0.9614 -
80000 0.9275 - 0.9876 - 0.9973 - 0.9994 - 0.9643 -
70000 0.9241 - 0.9882 - 0.9981 - 0.9994 - 0.9459 -
60000 0.9236 - 0.9878 - 0.9975 - 1.0000 - 0.9338 -
50000 0.9348 - 0.9871 - 0.9977 - 1.000 - 0.8941 -
40000 0.9518 - 0.9933 - 0.9993 - 1.000 - 0.7595 -
30000 0.9835 - 0.9980 - 0.9994 - 1.000 - 0.4741 -
20000 0.9999 - 1.0000 - 1.0000 - 1.0000 - 0.0351 -
10000 1.0000 - 1.0000 - 1.0000 - 1.0000 - 0.0000 -
Table 3. Sensitivity and specificity of the source detection techniques with each source
having 1% SNR. (BP refers to backprojection, see [5])tab: perf_ms_1
We remind the reader that sensitivity, or true positive rate, shows the success of
determining the presence of a source (i.e., few false negatives), while specificity reflects
how well the absence of the source is detected (i.e., few false positives)+.
The accuracy of the prediction generally increases with particle count (and thus
+ High specificity was hardwired into the BP techniques [5, 6], it was only the sensitivity that was
questionable.
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Sensitivity
one
source
Sensitivity
two
sources
Sensitivity
three
sources
Sensitivity
four
sources
Specificity
Expected Particle Count CNN BP CNN BP CNN BP CNN BP CNN BP
100000 0.9373 - 0.7669 - 0.6661 - 0.6093 - 0.9666 -
90000 0.9341 - 0.7591 - 0.6643 - 0.6047 - 0.9661 -
80000 0.9282 - 0.7577 - 0.6608 - 0.5961 - 0.9603 -
70000 0.9245 - 0.7562 - 0.6617 - 0.5909 - 0.9511 -
60000 0.9287 - 0.7668 - 0.6670 - 0.6157 - 0.9350 -
50000 0.9356 - 0.7878 - 0.6989 - 0.6438 - 0.8907 -
40000 0.9547 - 0.8496 - 0.7655 - 0.7204 - 0.7716 -
30000 0.9846 - 0.9384 - 0.9041 - 0.8774 - 0.4695 -
20000 0.9994 - 0.9978 - 0.9967 - 0.9931 - 0.0409 -
10000 1.0000 - 1.0000 - 1.0000 - 1.0000 - 0.0000 -
Table 4. Sensitivity and specificity of the source detection techniques with split source
strength (BP refers to backprojection, see [5])tab:perf_ms_2
observation time), and sufficient particle counts are required for successful detection. While
at the level of the total of 10000 particles the detectability fails∗, for 100000 particles CNN
succeeds extremely well and beats hands down the backprojection technique, which does
not show any statistically significant deviations and thus does not detect presence of the
source. Notice that the level of around 600000 particles was required in [5] and [29] for
stable detection, even without complex cargo being involved.
7.1. Observation time
The above results are presented in terms of the total number of particles detected. The
conclusion is natural: the larger - the better. The number of detected particles obviously
increases with the time of observation. However, this relation clearly depends significantly
on the type and configuration of the cargo.
The flux measured at the boundary is a function of the placement of materials in
the cargo, as well as of the source strength and position, and of the background level.
Accordingly, to reach the number of particle measurements necessary for source detection
shown in Tables
tab: perf_ms_1
3 and
tab:perf_ms_2
4, different exposure times are required for different cargo. These
exposure times can vary from times on the order of a fraction of a second, when mostly low
scattering or absorbing materials are present, to as high as a week and beyond when a high
proportion of the container’s volume is filled with heavily shielding iron. In the following
subsections, a selection of example scenarios are presented to give an idea of what exposure
∗ The reader should not be mislead by high sensitivity numbers, since the low specificity shows that algorithm
always thinks that there is a source, if the total count is low.
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times to expect in different scenarios.
Since the cargo is never exactly known, what is the deal? The conclusion is that one waits
the time allowed, and if it is insufficient, the source will go undetected. In several examples
below the reader see such situations when extremely long observation time required makes
detection at boarder crossing unfeasible. However, stationary detectors built into cargo
containers on ships could be very handy.
7.2. Example Scenarios
S:Ex1
7.2.1. Example #1
This configuration as well as backprojection with source present is shown in Figure
fig:Ex1
6
below. It is evident that the corridor highlighting phenomenon observed in [6] is exhibited
in the backprojection for this configuration, while the backprojection algorithm still fails to
detect presence of the source. The network, on the other hand, succeeds in detecting the
source. This is one of the heavy iron configuration from the testing set which has a shorter
exposure time (18 seconds for 101,180 background particles).
Figure 6. Left: Backprojection with source present. Right: Cargo configuration with source
location indicated by arrow. 101,180 particles detected, 100,185 background particles and
995 source particles. Exposure time is 18 seconds.fig:Ex1
S:Ex2
7.2.2. Example #2
Next we consider the scenario (Figure
fig:Ex2
7), where backprojection fails to detect the source
but the network succeeds. Here the exposure time is significantly longer. In this configuration
a long thick iron slab effectively blocks one side of the detectors. Smaller chunks of iron
spread throughout the container further attenuate the signal along certain trajectories. As
a result, it takes 9 hours and 26 minutes to detect 101,092 particles.
Deep learning for source detection 14
Figure 7. Cargo configuration with source location indicated by arrow. 101,092 particles
detected, 100,095 background particles and 997 source particles. Exposure time is 9 hours
and 26 minutes.fig:Ex2
S:Ex3
7.2.3. Example #3
Here we consider perhaps a more tenable scenario in Figure
fig:Ex3
8 where backprojection fails
to detect the source, yet the network succeeds. In this case the exposure time is 50 minutes
and 17 seconds for 100,866 particles. In this configuration several large blocks of iron are
periodically tiled in the container, with the source located within one of the blocks.
Figure 8. Cargo configuration with source location indicated by arrow. 100,866 particles
detected, 99,867 background particles and 999 source particles. Exposure time is 50 minutes
and 17 seconds.fig:Ex3
S:Ex4
7.2.4. Example #4
Now we consider a somewhat extreme scenario where both approaches succeed in
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detecting the source. In this case the exposure time is 3 days and 12 hours for 101,272
particles. In this configuration one very large block of iron in the center of the container
surrounds the source. The source is still localized relatively well by backprojection for this
scenario, which suggests it is one of the borderline cases where backprojection may still work
with proper choice of parameters. Most of the cargo is filled with a homogeneous material,
which explains why backprojection did not fail. The configuration can be seen in Figure
fig:Ex4
9
below.
Figure 9. Left: Backprojection with source present. Right: Cargo configuration with source
location indicated by arrow. 101,272 particles detected, 100,328 background particles and
944 source particles. Exposure time is 3 days and 12 hours.fig:Ex4
S:Ex5
7.2.5. Example #5
Finally, we consider a rather easy scenario where both backprojection and the network
succeed. In this case the exposure time is 276 milliseconds for 100,898 particles. In this
configuration several small blocks of different materials are spread throughout the container.
Only an insignificant amount of particles are scattered, so backprojection recovers the source
distribution extremely well. The configuration can be seen in Figure
fig:Ex5
10 below.
8. Remarks and Conclusions
S:remarks
• Our work shows that the deep learning approach significantly improves over detection by
backprojection techniques of [6,26,29] and works for complex attenuating and scattering
cargo scenarios, where the latter fails completely. This confirms the opinion expressed
in [6] that some information about source presence was there.
• A variety of symmetry rules, including rotational symmetry and mirror symmetry are
applied randomly to the resulting configurations. Materials are then assigned randomly
to the boxes. A subset of the symmetric configurations have material assigned according
to the associated symmetry rule.
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Figure 10. Left: Backprojection with source present. Right: Cargo configuration iwth
source configuration indicated by arrow. 100,898 particles detected, 99,911 background
particles and 987 source particles. Exposure time is 276milliseconds.fig:Ex5
Remark. For this work, we randomly select, prior to cargo generation, which symmetry
rules to apply. Each cargo symmetry rule has equal selection probability, and each
material symmetry rule has equal selection probability.
• Several sources
• The exposure time required to reach a certain level of particle detections is a function
of the configuration of the cargo, including source location, material composition, and
material placement. This makes it difficult to predict boundary flux rates, even if the
configuration is known, without solving the Boltzmann equation (
eq: Boltzmann
1. As a general rule of
thumb, the more high-Z materials present, such as iron, the lower will be the boundary
flux. Figure
fig:ExposureTimes
11 reflects the result of several thousand configuration runs for detecting
the presence of a source emitting on the order of 1000 particles. This is a histogram of
the runs vs. time required for detection Generally speaking, the large bin on the left-
hand side corresponds to configurations with less high-Z materials, and the larger bins
on the right-hand side correspond to configurations with more high-Z materials. It can
certainly become unrealistic to detect many source particles in some of the latter cases.
Nevertheless, as is evidenced by some of the examples presented previously, certain
configurations of high-Z material exist where many source particles can be detected in
a reasonable amount of time. These lower exposure time scenarios would be the most
appropriate cases for detecting illlicit nuclear materials at a border crossing. Some of
the longer exposure times (on the order of several minutes to perhaps several days)
would be appropriate for detection of illicit nuclear materials in shipping containers on
cargo ships, where scanning can be done while the container is in transit.
• No inverse crime
• Uncertainty
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Figure 11. Histogram of the number of runs vs. exposure times required for detection.fig:ExposureTimes
• There are various further improvements that one should attempt, some of which are
addressed below.
(i) Producing many more training data is a serious stumbling block in 2D, and
especially in 3D case.
(ii) The CNN architecture should be improved for reaching shorter observation time
and even lower SNR levels.
(iii) We are working on moving to the more realistic 3D situation. The significant
difference here is, first, the much higher dimensionality of the data (5D) and
corresponding much more massive computations that are needed. Second, in 3D,
unlike 2D, the Compton data differ significantly from the usual Radon ones. In
particular, an issue arises even when entering the data in a way that makes use of
CNNs plausible.
(iv) The neural network approach should be tested on real data, which the authors
currently do not have. However, the radiative transport forward computations we
used seem to be very realistic and involve realistic material parameters.
(v) The approach we describe indicates presence of a source, but not its location (at
least in the heavy iron cargo case). One wonders whether location can also be
attempted.
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10. Appendix
S:Appendix
10.1. Perlin noise
SS:Perlin
Perlin noise P (x) can be generated for a square domain such as [0, 1]d as follows:
• fix a regularly spaced lattice of points {xk}nk=1 ∈ [0, 1]d,
• assign a random unit vector uk to each grid point xk in the lattice,
• for each point x ∈ [0, 1]d compute the dot product uk · (x− xj), where xj is one of the
2d grid points closest to x,
• compute P (x) by interpolating between the 2d dot products corresponding to x and
normalizing to a desired range.
This process is shown in Fig.
fig:Perlin
12.
Figure 12. Perlin noise generation procedure. (Left): Randomly generated
unit vectors at grid points. (Middle): Dot products with nearest grid points.
(Right): Interpolation of dot products (Credit: Matthewslf Creative Commons License:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.en)fig:Perlin
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10.2. Algorithm for Procedural Generation of Cargo Configurations
SS:algorithm
Algorithm 1: Procedural Cargo Configuration
Generate Perlin noise in cargo;
Initialize nx and ny to desired number of vertical and horizontal boundaries
(numbers can be chosen randomly);
Sum Perlin noise over rows and columns to produce noise function on edge of cargo;
Randomly select nx distinct x−coordinates for vertical boundaries and ny distinct
y−coordinates for horizontal boundaries according to edge noise functions. Store in
x and y respectively.;
niter = 0 ;
while nx > 0 or ny > 0 do
if niter is even and nx > 0 then
Determine all existing boundary points along the line (x[niter/2], y).
Randomly select a starting point ys and ending point ye from among the
existing boundary points according to previously generated Perlin noise. Set
all points between (x[niter/2], ys) and (x[niter/2], ye) to boundary points.;
nx = nx − 1;
niter = niter + 1;
else if niter is odd and ny > 0 then
Determine all existing boundary points along the line (x, (y[(niter − 1)/2]).
Randomly select a starting point xs and ending point xe from among the
existing boundary points according to previously generated Perlin noise. Set
all points between (xs, (y[(niter − 1)/2]) and (xe, (y[(niter − 1)/2]) to
boundary points.;
ny = ny − 1;
niter = niter + 1;
end
Identify connected components (Scipy.Measure.Label);
if Rotational Symmetry Desired then
Copy one quadrant of the configuration over all others with appropriate rotation;
if Mirror Symmetry Desired then
Copy one side of the configuration over the other with mirroring ;
... Randomly assign material identification to each connected component ;
Save configuration to file;
Result: Single cargo configuration
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Group Index Lower Bound (MeV ) Upper Bound (MeV )
1 2.61449 2.61451
2 2.56137 2.61449
3 2.50824 2.56137
4 2.45512 2.50824
5 2.402 2.45512
6 2.34887 2.402
7 2.29575 2.34887
8 2.24262 2.29575
9 2.1895 2.24262
10 2.13638 2.1895
11 2.08325 2.13638
12 2.03013 2.08325
13 1.977 2.03013
14 1.92388 1.977
15 1.87076 1.92388
16 1.81763 1.87076
17 1.76451 1.81763
18 1.76449 1.76451
19 1.71391 1.76449
20 1.66333 1.71391
21 1.61275 1.66333
22 1.56217 1.61275
23 1.51159 1.56217
24 1.46101 1.51159
25 1.46099 1.46101
26 1.40421 1.46099
27 1.34743 1.40421
28 1.29065 1.34743
29 1.23387 1.29065
30 1.17709 1.23387
31 1.12031 1.17709
32 1.12029 1.12031
33 1.09047 1.12029
34 1.06065 1.09047
35 1.03083 1.06065
36 1.00101 1.03083
37 1.00099 1.00101
Table 5. Energy Group Structuretab:egroups
